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Abstract 
The Chinese share market as an emerging and fast-growing listing venue has experienced a significant 
development since 2000.Prior studies on this market overwhelmingly concentrate on 
IPO-pricing-related and post-IPO performance-based propositions with lagging data. Adopting the 
updated data within the last couple of years, this paper comprehensively explores and accounts for 
some striking features of the Chinese stock market, and unfolds some new causes contributing to these 
characteristics. 
Some new findings are revealed. 1) Two new factors may lead to the extreme under pricing in China’s 
market, which are the unseasoned investor sand their high demands of IPO shares. 2) The 
foreign-currency trading platform is not effective and efficient to attract the overseas investors. 3) The 
imbalanced industry structure of the listed firms is very significant, the Chinese share market is 
dominated by the manufacturing firms.4) The Growth Enterprise Market of China is essential to 
address the long-standing financing difficulties for the Chinese Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 
which are unqualified to raise capital from the Primary Stock Market. 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
There are various stock exchanges around the world, but only approximately 50 exchanges are active 
[1]. They are roughly classified as: well-developed markets, such as NASDQ America, New York Stock 
Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Singapore Stock Exchange; and developing markets, including 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China, Brazil Stock Exchange, National Stock Exchange 
of India, Moscow Exchange in Russia (Claessens and Schmukler, 2007). Caglio et al. (2011) argue that 
this situation has been increasingly changing. Some developed markets are losing their leading role, but 
some developing markets are growing into global listing venues. The Chinese market is one of the 
fast-growing markets. With many years of consecutive economy growth, since 2010 China has become 
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the second largest economy community in terms of GDP in the world (Bloomberg, 2010). Meanwhile, 
China’s stock market has become considerably active in aspects of both issuing amount and share 
number since then.  
As Table 1 shows, the two Chinese exchanges—Shenzhen and Shanghai were globally ranked within 
the Top 5 exchanges. In 2010, Shenzhen Exchange was ranked NO. 1 in IPO firm quantity of 321 IPO 
companies, which occupied around 23 percent of global firm number (321/1393=23%). Shenzhen 
Exchange was also ranked at Top 3 in IPO amount of US$30.2 billion raised, followed by Shanghai 
Exchange with US$27.9 billion. In 2011, Shenzhen Exchange was still ranked NO. 1 in IPO firm 
number of 243 IPO companies, which occupied around 19.8 percent of global IPO number 
(243/1225=19.8%). Shenzhen Exchange and Shanghai Exchange occupied Top 3 and Top 4 
respectively in IPO amount. Thus, China’s stock market plays an important role in global financial 
markets. 
 
Table 1. Global Top 5 Exchanges in IPO Number and Amount in 2010 and 2011 
 2010 2011 
Global NO. of IPO Firms 1393  1225 
Capital Raised (US$)Globally $284.6billion $169.9billion 
Number of IPO Firms 
Shenzhen (321) Shenzhen (243) 
Australian (92) Warsaw (123) 
Hong Kong (87) Australian (101) 
New York (82) Hong Kong (68) 
NASDAQ (76) New York (67) 
Amount (US$billion) 
Hong Kong ($57.4) New York ($30.5) 
New York ($34.7) Hong Kong ($25.3) 
Shenzhen ($30.2) Shenzhen($15.7) 
Shanghai ($27.9) Shanghai ($15.1) 
Tokyo ($14.3) London ($13.9) 
Source: Dealogic, Thomson Financial, Ernst & Young (2012) 
 
There is some literature discussing the Chinese equity markets from an institutional perspective (see 
Chen et al., 2000; Hung et al., 2012), but very little of them suggests that some characteristics attribute 
to the institutional context of the Chinese stock market. This study bridges this gap. It uses some 
up-to-date data to shed light on the unique characteristics from different perspectives. Employing a 
descriptive approach, it reveals some new causes that lead to these striking features. The aim of this 
paper is in an effort to trigger some potential researches to investigate further the propositions related to 
these new causes. 
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This paper is organized in two sections: the Chinese Primary Stock Market and the Growth Enterprise 
Market of China (GEMC), which are two different tiers of stock markets in China. This study firstly 
outlines the institutional context, and striking features of the Primary Stock Market, because this 
administrative (institutional) context is a basis to investigate any proposition from the Chinese financial 
market (Walter and Howie, 2006).Secondly, it presents the significance of establishing GEMC, and 
then explores the differences between the GEMC and Primary Market.  
 
2. Chinese Primary Stock Market 
This section outlines the institutional context of China’s stock market, and then presents some unique 
characteristics. 
2.1 Institutional Context 
The most prominent context is that this market is a product of the Chinese economic reform converting 
the government-planned economy to the market-oriented economy. It provides the Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) with a platform to achieve the privatization of state assets. Megginson 
and Netter (2001) suggest that the privatization of state assets is widely viewed as one measure for 
improving and achieving a long-run economic growth. According to Chen et al. (2000), the first 
privatization in China emerged in 1984, but the privatization process has proceeded very slowly. The 
Chinese government established Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) in 1990 and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) one year later to accelerate the process. Under this context, the Primary Stock 
Market is dominated by the Chinese SOEs. As Table 2 and 3exhibite, the Top 10 A-shares (this is a type 
of shares in China’s stock market, please refer to the second feature in the following subsection – 
Unique characteristics) in both issuing volume and market capitalization were overwhelmingly 
dominated by the SOEs in 2011. 
 
Table2. Top 10 A-Share by Issuing Volume in SHSE (2011) 
Code Issuers Issued Vol. (Million) % 
601288 Agricultural Bank of China 294,055.29 12.6 
601398 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 262,225.50 11.24 
601988 Bank of China 195,525.05 8.38 
601857 China National Petroleum Corporation 161,922.08 6.94 
600028 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation 69,922.06 3.00 
601818 China Everbright Bank 40,434.79 1.73 
601328 Bank of Communications 32,709.16 1.4 
601998 China Citic Bank 31,905.16 1.37 
601668 China State Construction 30,000.00 1.29 
600018 Shanghai International Port 22,755.18 0.98 
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Sum  1,14,154.17 48.92 
Total on the SHSE 2,333,237.21 100 
Source: Yearbook of Shanghai Stock Exchange 2012 
 
As the table shows, the most significant feature is that this group of issuers including six national banks 
(601288, 601398, 601988, 601818, 601328, 601998) and two national energy companies (601857, 
600028) are owned by the government, apart from the last two ones. In addition, the 10 issuers’ shares 
accounted for 48.92 percent of the total share volume issued in the SHSE with around 1,000 listed 
companies. By contrast, the top 10 issuers in US stock markets, even assuming all are national firms, 
retained around 5.08 percent of the total share volume by 4th January 2013 [3]. This reflects that 
China’s Primary Stock Market is a SOEs-dominated listing platform that is designed for the SOEs.  
 
Table 3. Top 10 A-Share by Market Capitalization in SHSE (2011) 
Code Issuers Market Cap. (¥ M) % 
601857 China National Petroleum Corporation 1,577,121.04 10.68 
601398 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 1,111,836.11 7.53 
601288 Agricultural Bank of China 770,424.87 5.22 
601988 Bank of China 570,933.14 3.87 
600028 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation 502,040.43 3.40 
601088 China Shenhua Energy Company Limited 417,717.99 2.83 
601628 China Life Insurance Group 367,327.07 2.49 
600036 China Merchants Bank 209,696.97 1.42 
600519 Guizhou Maotai Group 200,680.19 1.36 
601318 China Pingan Insurance Group 164,843.95 1.12 
Sum  5,892,621.76 39.9 
Total on the SHSE 14,769,275.78 100 
Source: Yearbook of Shanghai Stock Exchange 2012 
 
On the market capitalization of the 10 issuers, it accounted for 39.9 percent of the total capitalization in 
the same market. Similarly, all these issuers are completely national enterprises. Although an increasing 
number of non-SOEs have been listed on the stock market, and diversified ownership structure of 
listings (Cheng et al. 2013), the SOE firms have more privileges from the government than other 
non-SOE companies. For instance, the SOEs have favorable access to bank loans (Brandt and Li, 2003), 
lower costs of capital (Borisova and Megginson, 2011), and advantages in monopoly (Li, 2009). 
Consequently, the SOEs have advantages in policy supports and financial subsidies, which are able to 
promote their IPO performance (Powers and McDougall, 2005). 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp               Journal of Business Theory and Practice                  Vol. 2, No. 1, 2014 
104 
Published by SCHOLINK CO., LTD 
2.2 Unique Characteristics 
The special institutional context of China’s stock market may lead to its unique characteristics 
including extreme underpricing performances in the short run, a dual-currency trading mechanism, 
unbalanced industry structures. 
(1) The most significant feature is remarkable underpricing performances in the short run. Although 
there are many determinants influencing IPO underpricing, the strict government regulation is a very 
vital factor in China (Gu, 2003). Unlike the pricing strategies in the US market, where the issuers with 
assistance of investment banks determine their issuing prices in a book-building method (Su and 
Fleisher, 1999; Sherman, 2000). In China, the IPO pricing is determined by the CSRC (Kimbro, 2005). 
The CSRC employs a price earning rate (PE) as a benchmark to determine the pricing range of an IPO. 
Based on the listed IPO firms during 1993 to 1998, their IPO prices were instructed around 13-15 times 
of PE. Currently, this benchmark for the majority of IPO firms maintains around 30 times (see Table 4). 
Once the CSRC confirms the pricing of an IPO, the share allocations are conducted by a lottery 
mechanism, and then the winners are allowed to purchase an amount of shares at the fixed IPO price. 
This administrative pricing approach gets the share prices deviating from the great demands of the 
public investors. Consequently, it results in a remarkable underpricing phenomenon. 
 
Table 4. PE Distributions in the SHSE (2011) 
PE Times 0-10 10-30 30-50 50-100 >100 Others 
No. of Shares 57 68 395 166 143 140 
% 5.88 7.02 40.76 17.13 14.76 14.45 
 Source: Yearbook of Shanghai Stock Exchange 2012 
 
As Table 5 shows, the underpricing appears to perform dramatically in China than those in other 
countries. The average initial return in China’s exchanges is 137.4%, which is more than 8 times of 
those in the exchanges of the US, UK and Hong Kong.  
 
Table 5. Comparison of Equally Weighted Average Initial Returns with Other Exchanges 
Categories Exchanges Sources Samples Period  Return 
 China Chen et al.; Jia & Zhang 2102 1990-2010 137.4%
Developing Brazil Aggarwalet al.; Saito; Ushisima 275 1979-2011 33.1% 
 India Marisetty and Subrahmanyam; 
Ritter 
2964 1990-2011 88.5% 
 Russia Ritter 40 1999-2006 4.2% 
 U.S. Ibbotson et al.; Ritter 12246 1960-2011 16.8% 
 U.K. Dimson; Levis 4877 1959-2011 16.1% 
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Developed Germany Ljungqvist; Rocholl: Ritter; 736 1978-2011 24.2% 
 Japan Fukuda; Hebner & Hiraki; 
Pettway & Kaneko 
3100 1970-2010 40.4% 
 Singapore Lee et al.; Dawson; Ritter 591 1973-2011 26.1% 
 Hong 
Kong 
McGuinness; Zhao & Wu; 
Ljungqvist & Yu; Ritter 
1259 1980-2010 15.4% 
 Australia Lee et al.; Woo; Pham; Ritter 1562 1976-2011 4.4% 
Source: Loughran et al. (1994). 
 
Although the IPO underpricing is a global phenomenon across countries (see Loughran et al., 1994), I 
found three causes resulting in this anomalous performance. 
The first cause is the unseasoned Chinese investors. As Figure1 indicates, a majority of the Chinese 
investors (35.31%+32.40%=67.71%) are under 40 ages, but the average age of the US investors is 51. 
In addition, the majority of the Chinese investors lack experience of share investment. Figure2 shows 
that only 4.52 percent of the Chinese investors have an over 15 years investment experience, in 
addition, 32.35 percent of investors have a less 3-year share trading record. In terms of their 
educational levels, as Figure3 shows, only 19.56 percent (15.82%+3.74%) of the Chinese investors 
hold a bachelor degree and above in SHSE. However, 56 percent of US investors have a bachelor 
degree (according to a report by Statistical Centre of Settlement Database of China 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1. Age Range of the Investors in SHSE in 2012 
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Figure 2. Investment Experience by Trading Years by 2012in SHSE 
 
 
Figure 3. Educational Background of the Investors in SHSE (2012) 
 
The second one is political incentives. The relevant politicians are likely to encourage this sort of 
underpricing IPOs, because of the strong government-oriented context in China. These politicians 
intend to through the high returns attract more prospective new issuers and political media coverages. 
Receiving a wide coverage in the top political media outlets is vital for these politicians because such 
visibilities may contribute to their political position in the Communist Part of China. As Banyan (2009) 
suggested, influential political media in China is more likely to draw attention from the national leaders, 
which is able to advance these politicians’ career. 
The last one is high demands to IPO shares. This high demands attribute to a large number of domestic 
investors in China. As Figure 4 shows, there was an increasing number of individual investors engaged 
in A-share trading in the last 10 years. There have been over 200 million individual investors in the 
Chinese Mainboard by the end of 2012. Derrien (2005) suggests that IPOs with high demands of 
individual investors are more likely to be overvalued and thus lead to sharp underpricings. 
The high demands to IPO shares are also due to lacking alternative investment choice in China, so the 
Chinese investors like to pay high prices for the new shares. According to statistical records from 
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National Bureau of Statistics of China, the per capita income of the Chinese residents increased 14.75% 
per year on average during 2002 to 2012. Meanwhile, the bank interest rate of one-year term deposit 
remained around 2.60% within the 10 years, but the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rate remained around 
2.63% on average per year. Consequently, the Chinese residents were willing to invest in shares for 
more returns rather than bank deposits. 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of Individual Investors in Mainboard 2002-2012 (M.) 
 
Additionally, this type of issuing mechanism lacks market-orientated factors, because the annual IPO 
quota is determined by the central government. As a result, the gap between the high IPO demands and 
unreasonable allocations result in the extreme underpricing too. 
(2) The second feature is the dual-currency trading platforms. There are two types of shares or trading 
systems: A-share and B-share. The A-share is restricted to be traded by the domestic investors in the 
Chinese currency only. Since 2003 some qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) have been 
allowed to trade A-shares in the same currency. The B-share was in early 1990s created specially for 
the overseas investors trading it in US or Hong Kong dollar, in order to attract foreign funds to the 
Chinese securities markets. Since February 2001, it has been available for the domestic individual 
investors to trade B-shares in a foreign currency. Apart from attracting more foreign investors, the 
Chinese government separated the share types to protect its financial market and economy from 
external impacts, as the emerging securities market and growing economy were still vulnerable. This 
unique dual-currency trade system is exclusive to China’s stock market. 
I found that the B-share platform has been marginalized and lagged far behind that of A-share, due to a 
limited number of issuers and investors, particularly foreign investors. As Table 6 demonstrates, only 
54 firms issued B-share in SHSE, while 921 firms issued A-share there, which were around 4 times of 
B-share. The small number of B-share leads to its limited TMC. In addition, the DTTV reflects the 
B-share is an inactive trading platform because of its low trading value ¥3.06 million per day.  
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Table 6. Comparison between A-Shares and B-Shares in SHSE 2011 
Types NS TMC (¥ M) ATTV (¥ M) DTTV (¥ M) NI (M) T.R. 
A-share 921 147692.76 236809.12 970.53 85.5085 125.09 
B-share 54 683.47 746.19 3.06 1.5417 86.8 
Source: Yearbook of Shanghai Stock Exchange 2012 
Note: NS means the number of stocks; TMC means the total market capitalization; ATTA means the 
annual total trading value; DTTV means daily total trading value on average; NI means the number of 
investors; TR. means the turnover rate. 
 
As Table 7 illustrates, there were around 1.5 million B-share investors, which was low far more from 
215 million A-share investors. Additionally, 95.34 percent of B-share investor was the domestic 
investor; by contrast, less 5 percent of B-share investor was from overseas. Lee et al. (2008) attribute 
this reason to less liquidity and relative risks in B-share platform. As a consequence, low demand of 
B-share for the foreign investors get the foreign-currency-based system marginalized and lagged far 
behind A-share. 
 
Table 7. Distribution of Foreign Investors for B-Share 2012 
Countries/Regions No. of Investors Percent 
China 1,476,326 95.34 
US 14,869 0.96 
Canada 3,735 0.24 
Taiwan 8,736 0.56 
UK 2,390 0.15 
Hong Kong 17,156 1.11 
Australia 3,267 0.21 
Japan 4,569 0.30 
Germany 722 0.05 
Singapore 1,935 0.12 
Korea 1,784 0.12 
Netherland 413 0.03 
France 641 0.04 
Macau 804 0.05 
Others 11,025 0.71 
Total 1,548,372 100 
Source: Annual Yearbook 2012 of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
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Meanwhile, the prospect of an international board in China accelerates the marginalization of B-share. 
Recently, some media outlets frequently signaled the Chinese government has been engaged in 
preparation of an international board. Once this board is ready, it will attract more foreign companies to 
go public there. As such, the overseas investors will transfer from the B-share platform to the 
international board. As a result, the B-share trading system will be even more marginalized than ever. 
(3) The third one is the imbalanced industry structure. The Chinese securities markets lean heavily 
towards manufacturing firms, due to China’s economy structure. As Table8 indicates, in China, the 
manufacturing sector in 2011 was predominant with 84IPO firms, which accounted for approximately 
32.31 percent of total IPO firms in the Chinese listing markets. This sector was the second largest 
sector with US$11.7 billion capital raised, which accounted for around 27.08 percent of total capital. 
While the manufacturing sector was excluded from the top 5 groups in the US, and the dominant 
sectors are all service business-based industries. As a consequence, it is not surprising that China is 
well known as the World’s Factory or the Global Manufacturer.  
 
Table 8. Top 5 IPOs Distribution by Industry Sectors in the Year of 2011 
 China US 
Number of IPO Firms Manufacture (84) High Technologh (23) 
Materials (72) Energy (25) 
High Technology (40) Health Care (16) 
Consumer Staples (36) Consumer Products (9) 
Comsumer Products (28) Real Estate (9) 
Capital Raised Materials (US$11.9b) Energy (US$9.3b) 
Manufacture (US$11.7b) High technology (US$8.1b) 
Energy (US$6.8) Health Care (US$5.9) 
Retail (US$6.6) Consumer Products (US$3.9) 
Financials (US$6.2) Retail (US$3.8) 
Source: Dealogic, Thomson Financial, Ernst & Young (2011). 
 
Although there is no a common view on what an ideal proportion of sector allocation should be in a 
stock market, a diversified market with a balanced industry allocation may be more attractive to 
investment portfolios, and consequently is conducive to a sustainable development of economy. As 
Table9 demonstrates, industry sectors in global exchanges evenly distribute in general. However, the 
Chinese stock exchange presents a different distribution pattern. The manufacturing-related sectors in 
China account for 58.3 percent of total listings, which is extremely higher than the global average level 
35.47%. By contrast, other sectors have a low proportion. In addition, service-related sectors 
dominating global exchanges, such as the financials at 9.07%, social services at 11.18%, the sectors 
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have very low ratio (0.70% and 3.6% respectively) in the Chinese market.  
 
Table 9. Distribution by Industry Sectors on Chinese Exchange & Global Exchange 
Industry Sectors  China Stock Exchange* Global Exchanges on Average**
 
Capitalization(¥ B
illion) 
N. of 
Listings 
% 
listings 
N. of listings % IPOs
Total 6,115.2 1582 100 16492 100 
Agriculture 92.6 29 1.83 9 0.05 
Metals &Mining 734.5 151 9.54 1309 7.93 
Manufacturing 3,257.2 923 58.3 5849 35.47 
Food & Beverage 551.9 60 3.79 571 3.46 
Household Goods 124.2 60 3.79 899 5.45 
Paper & Printing 70.5 32 2.02 88 0.53 
Petrochemicals 480.6 184 11.63 670 4.06 
Electronics 445.3 125 7.90 955 5.79 
Machinery 1,055.3 350 22.12 1379 8.36 
Pharmaceuticals 468 91 5.75 738 4.47 
Others 60.4 21 1.33 549 3.32 
Public Utilities 126.4 29 1.83 227 1.38 
Construction 143.7 26 1.64 605 3.67 
Transportation 68.5 28 1.77 344 2.09 
IT 377 162 10.24 2061 12.50 
Wholesale & Retail 255.9 64 4.05 836 5.07 
Financials 278.7 11 0.70 1496 9.07 
Real Estate 401 64 4.05 575 3.49 
Social Services 232.7 57 3.60 1844 11.18 
Media 81.8 19 1.20 758 4.60 
Others 65.1 19 1.20 579 3.51 
* This group of data was collected from the official website of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange updated 
on November 2012. Dataset on the Shanghai Stock Exchange is not involved.  
** This group of data is from Caglio et al. (2011). 
 
I found that this feature attributes to China’s macro-industry structure. In the past 20 years from1990 to 
2010, it has experienced 5 times of structural adjustments. As Table 10 illustrates, the significant 
features are ① The proportion of the Primary Industry to GDP sharply decreased from 27.1% in 1990 
to 10.2% in 2010. ②  The Secondary Industry dominated China’s industry structure remaining at 
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around 45%. ③ The Tertiary Industry gradually increased from 31.6% to 43.0% in 2010. Therefore, 
the Secondary-Industry-dominated features of China’s macro-industry are reflected in its stock market. 
According to Memedovic and Lapadre (2010), the proportions of the three industries in developed 
countries account for around 2%, 32%, and 66% respectively. This structure is expected to be adjusted 
in the future. 
 
Table 10. Structural Adjustments in China’s Macro-Industry 1990-2010 (%) 
Years GDP Primary Industry Secondary Industry Tertiary Industry 
1990 100.0 27.1 41.3 31.6 
1995 100.0 19.9 47.2 32.9 
2000 100.0 15.1 45.9 39.0 
2005 100.0 12.2 47.7 40.1 
2010 100.0 10.2 46.9 43.0 
Source: Website of National Bureau of Statistics of China (www.stats.gov.cn). 
 
To sum up, these unique characteristics (anomalous underpricing, dual-currency trading mechanism, 
unbalanced industry structure) and their causes in the Chinese stock market get it totally different from 
overseas markets.  
 
3. The Growth Enterprise Market of China 
As studies suggested, a vibrant stock market may contribute to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
employment growth (e.g., Weild and Kim, 2009). Meanwhile, some stock exchanges view the listings 
as considerable source of revenue, so they lower their entry thresholds or set up new listing platforms 
for the small and fast growing firms, in an effort to attract more firms to go public there. This strategy 
may help these exchanges obtain more incomes (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). So far, the majority 
of developed equity markets have established their Growth Enterprise Market (or called Secondary 
Board; Alternative Market) to diversify their trading platforms to cater for different investors, such as 
the NASDAQ in New York, the AIM in London, the SESDAQ in Singapore, the HKGEM in Hong 
Kong.  
The purpose of establishing the GEMC is not only diversifying the Chinese capital market, but also 
addressing the long-standing financing difficulties for the Chinese SMEs. The SMEs act as a pivotal 
role in terms of boosting economy, creating employment opportunities, advancing innovation in China. 
By the end of 2011, the Chinese SMEs have contributed to approximately 50 percent of national tax 
revenue, 60% GDP, 80% job opportunities, 65% patents and intellectual properties (according to the 
database from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China). 
The Chinese SMEs have been confronting financing difficulties for years (Chen and Wang, 2009). 
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According a survey (conducted by the National Development Centre of Peking University) in 2011, 78 
percent of SMEs have experienced or were experiencing financial shortage in Zhejiang –a SMEs 
dominated state. Additionally, 50 percent of owners of the SMEs raised fund through loanings from 
their relatives and friends, and other informal channels. They have no access to bank loans because of 
their high rate of loan default and low credit rate (Chen et al. 2010). Because of the SMEs’ contribution 
to the Chinese economy, the central government is keen to broaden the financing channels for the SME 
sand to bridge the financing gap. Under this circumstance, the GEMC was established, Cui et al. (2010) 
suggest that IPO markets are able to provide SMEs with efficient financing platforms, and reduce their 
financing cost greater than other channels.  
The GEMC was inaugurated in Shenzhen Stock Market on 30th October 2009 with 28 initial IPO 
companies. This market not only facilitates capital-raising for those growing SMEs that possess high 
profitability, technology innovation and advanced business models, it also facilitates venture capitalists 
exiting from their investee companies. According to the latest record of the GEMC official website, by 
10 September 2012 there have been 355 listed companies with total market capitalization at RMB 
¥924,877,099,614 and the total amount of issued shares 58,572,665,181. 
3.1 Significances of Establishing the GEMC 
The significances of the GEMC are fourfold. First of all, the GEMC provides those thriving 
entrepreneurial companies with direct fundraising opportunities. As Figure 5 shows, 355 firms have 
raised capital through IPOs in the listing market by 2012. The total amount of RMB ¥ 184.1 billion has 
been raised by August 2011. According the record from the CSRC website, there has been 262 IPO 
applicants on the IPO shortlist by 11th July 2013. It is expected that the number of listed firms on the 
GEMC will be over 500 very soon. Therefore, the GEMC facilitates small firms to raise fund for their 
future growth. 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of Listed Firms on GEMC (2009-2012) 
 
Secondly, this market provides the venture capital investors, who invest in those entrepreneurial 
companies, with an optimum exit channel, which motivates the Chinese venture capital industry. As 
table 11 outlines, the GEMC has become the preferred IPO market for venture capital investors to exist 
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since its inception in 2009, and over 40 percent (125 / 310 = 40.3%) and 52 percent of(50 / 95 = 52.6%) 
venture-capital-supported firms achieved their IPOs on the GEMC in 2011 and 2012 respectively.  
In terms of investment return rate for venture capitals, the GEMC had the best performance among the 
major IPO markets in the last three years. Over 12 times of return rates in the GEMC in 2010 and 2011 
are overwhelmingly greater than the counterparts in any other markets. Therefore, the GEMC facilitates 
venture capital investors to exit with higher return rates. 
 
Table 11. Distribution of IPO Firms Supported by Venture Capital 2009-2012 
 2009 2010 2011  2012 
 Firms
Return 
Rate Firms
Return 
Rate Firms
Return 
Rate Firms 
Return 
Rate 
GEMC 32 8.39 63 12.13 125 12.9 50 5.03 
SZSE 33 / 80 9.38 93 5.22 23 4.84 
SHSE 0 / 9 7.03 25 5.71 13 2.20 
HK 12 / 31 1.64 6 2.11 5 -.0.1 
NASDAQ 4 / 14 2.81 34 3.86 4 7.73 
NYSE 1 / 14 5.71 27 4.52 0 0 
Total 82  211  310  95  
Source: CV Source (www.chinaventure.com.cn). 
IPO Return Rate on average = (Pre-IPO share amount * IPO Price – Investment Amount) / Investment 
Amount. 
 
Thirdly, the GEMC helps the IPO firms standardize their corporate governance. Vast majority of 
entrepreneurial companies in China are run in a nonstandard way at their early stage, but they need 
gradually set up a modern corporate governance system catering for the IPO requirements. One of the 
traditional functions of stock exchanges is to develop corporate governance codes and 
recommendations for IPO firms. According to Provision 19 in the Provisional Administrative 
Regulations of Initial Public Offerings (PARIPO) in the GEMC, it requires that the issuers must set up 
a perfect governance structure of corporate, including shareholder meeting, board of directors, board of 
supervisors, independent director, board secretary, and audit committee systems. These appropriate 
regulations and behavior standards to these directors, supervisors and other executive managers enforce 
they fulfill their duties according to the laws. In addition, the GEMC requires, prior to submitting the 
IPO documents, the sponsors must conduct due diligence and assessment on the issuers. According to 
Provision 54 in the PARIPO, the sponsors who provide the CSRC with any fake information or 
document will be punished. They are also obliged to supervise and guide the issuers to operate 
regularly and lawfully on an ongoing basis. 
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Lastly, it promotesthe Chinese multi-level capital market that is composed of the Mainboard, the 
GEMC, and the Over-The-Counter Market, which serve those corporations at different developing 
stages. According to ‘Development Report of the Chinese Capital Market by the CSRC in 2008’, 
establishing a perfect multi-level capital market is an ongoing undertaking by 2020. The Mainboard 
serves those large-sized companies that need more external fund to expand and to be a leader in their 
industry; the GEMC serves those fast growing companies that raise capital for their technology 
innovation; the Over-The-Counter Market provides those companies that are unqualified to be listed on 
the GEMC with a fundraising channel. 
3.2 Comparison with China’s Primary Market 
The global alternative markets are inherently different from the Mainboard in their home country, in 
particular, these second-tier markets are independent but complementary to their primary market. These 
alternative markets aim to provide a listing platform for the small and fast-growing entrepreneurial 
firms that are unable to fulfill the listing regulations on the primary market (see Derrien and Kecskes, 
2007; Corwin and Harris, 2001). Like other alternative markets, the GEMC facilitates IPOs for those 
start-up companies with high technology and potential growth, which are unqualified to go public on 
China’s Mainboard. Thus, the GEMC is different from China’s Primary Stock Market in terms of their 
IPO firms, listing requirements and investors. 
(1) Different preferences to IPO firms. The GEMC and Mainboard have different preferences to IPO 
applicants because of their different establishing purposes. The Mainboard prefers the state-owned and 
large-sized companies. According to CSRC record, there has been 953 SOEs listed on the primary 
market by the end of 2012, accounting for around 40 percent of total listed firms on the market. As 
Table 12 shows, the average assets per firms on the Mainboard is 11.68 billion in 2011, which is far 
more greater than 1.47 billion on the GEMC, so the size of firms on the Mainboard is greater than the 
counterpart on the GEMC.  
Whereas, the purpose of establishing the GEMC is to facilitate the small firms raising capital for their 
high potential growths and innovative technologies, so it is a growth-and-profit-preferred market. As 
Table 12 indicates, the listed firms on the GEMC had higher growth rates in net profits (31.08% 
>14.45% in 2010, 12.83% > 5% in 2011), incomes (38.02% > 25.69% in 2010, 26.27% > 15.79% in 
2011) than the firms on the Mainboard. In addition, the net profits per share on the GEMC are also 
greater than those on the primary market (0.67>0.5 in 2010, 0.7>0.5). Therefore, the firms on the 
GEMC are featured by growth and profit. 
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Table 12. Comparison of Listed Firms in the GEMC and Mainboard (2010-2011) 
  2010 2011 
Mainboard Average Assets per Firm / 11.68 billion 
GEMC / 1.47 billion 
Mainboard Net Profit Growth Rate 14.45% 5% 
GEMC 31.08% 12.83% 
Mainboard Net Profit per Share 0.5 0.5 
GEMC 0.67 0.7 
Mainboard Income Growth Rate 25.69% 15.79% 
GEMC 38.02% 26.27% 
Source: Collected and sorted CSRC website (www.csrc.gov.cn). 
 
In addition, there are different industry coverages in the two tiers of trading venues. As Cheung and Liu 
(2013) suggested, the principal market covers the firms from diversified industry classifications, while 
the GEMC covers a small fraction with limited industries. According to ‘Advices on Recommending 
Firms to Go Public in the GEMC’ (No.8 CSRC Notification 2010), the Chinese government gives IPO 
priority to firms from these industry sectors: clean energy (NE), new materials (NM), biomedicine (BI), 
IT, advanced manufacture (AM), environment friendly (EF), marine engineering (ME), modern 
agriculture (MA), and other innovative firms. Unless having cutting-edge technologies and business 
models, the IPO applicants are restricted from these traditional sectors: textile, public utilities, 
construction and real estate, transportation, food, and other sectors against industry policies. 
(2) Different listing requirements. The two tiers of listing markets are designed for different developing 
stages of firms, so their listing standards are different. According to two independent IPO documents 
‘Administration Regulations for Initial Public Offerings in Primary Market’ and ‘Provisional 
Administration Regulations for Initial Public Offerings in Growth Enterprise Market’, the listing 
standards in China’s Mainboard market are very stricter than those in the GEMC (see Table13).  
 
Table 13. Comparison of the Listing Requirements between the Two Markets (2012) 
Criteria Primary Stock Market Growth Enterprise Market 
Main Body 
Qualification 
A joint stock limited company existing 
and conforming to the relative China’s 
laws and regulations.  
Share issuers have fully paid for 
registration capital, and the founders or 
stock- holders have completed the 
transaction of their assets as part of 
registration capital. There is no any 
issuewith asset ownership. 
Business Years At least 3 consecutive business years. At least 3 consecutive business years. 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp               Journal of Business Theory and Practice                  Vol. 2, No. 1, 2014 
116 
Published by SCHOLINK CO., LTD 
 
Profitability 
Positive net profit each financial year in 
the last three years and its accumulative 
net profit above RMB¥30 million; or 
Business cash flow of net sum more than 
RMB¥50 million in the three financial 
years, alternatively, at least RMB¥300 
million accumulative income during this 
period.  
Consecutive profitability with net 
profit of more than RMB¥10 million in 
the last two years, and keeping growing 
in the future; or 
having net profit of more than RMB¥5 
million from the last year, plus at least 
RMB¥50 million income and income 
growth rate above 30%. 
Asset 
Requirements 
Intangible asset ratio to net assets more 
than 20% in the last financial statements. 
At least RMB¥20 million net assetsby 
the end of financial year without any 
outstanding deficit. 
Share Amount At least RMB¥50 million stock sum after 
IPOs. RMB¥1/share 
At least RMB¥30 million stock sum 
after IPOs. RMB¥1/share 
Core Business Core business unchanged remarkably in 
the last three years. 
Core business prominent, and IPO for 
developing core business only. 
Defacto 
Controllers 
Defacto controllers unchanged in the last 
three years. 
Defacto controllers unchanged in the 
last two years. 
 
Horizontal 
Competition 
No horizontal competition with 
controlling shareholders, De facto 
controllers and business under their 
control. 
No horizontal competition with 
controlling shareholders, De facto 
controllers and business under their 
control. 
Source: Collected and sorted from the official website of China stock exchange market 
 
As Table 13 shows, the most significant feature between the two tiers of listing platforms is that the 
listing requirements on the GEMC are less stringent than the counterparts on the primary market. In 
other words, listing on the secondary market is easier relative to on the principal market. In profitability, 
the GEMC requires consecutive profit records in the last two years, while the Mainboard requires them 
in the last three years. The GEMC requires an issuer’s accumulative net profit over RMB¥10 million in 
the last two years, while the Mainboard requires it at least RMB¥30 million in the last three years. In 
assets, the GEMC requires at least RMB¥20 million of net assets in the last fiscal year without any 
outstanding deficit; the Mainboard requires an intangible asset ration to net assets less 20%. In share 
amount, the GEMC requires at least RMB¥30 million stock sum after IPOs; the GEMC requires at least 
RMB¥50 million stock sum after IPOs. 
Since the entry thresholds in the GEMC are lower than those in the Mainboard, it implies that there is 
more unrevealed information of the firms listed on the GEMC. Presumably, the information asymmetry 
in the GEMC is much more prevailing than in the Mainboard. As a consequence, the quality of the 
issuers in the Mainboard are likely to be better than those in the GEMC, but the growth potentials of 
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the listed firms on the GEMC are greater than those in the Mainboard (Cheung and Liu, 2013). 
(3) Differently experienced investors. Unlike the Mainboard, the GEMC adopts an investor access 
system to protect unseasoned investors from this highly risky market. According to Provisional 
Regulations on Adequacy of Investors in the GEMC (No. 14 CSRC Notification 2009), prior to trading 
on the GEMC, all investors must have over (including) two year trading experience in the primary 
market, and sign an agreement about the investment risks in the market, in order to remind the 
investors that the GEMC has higher risks than the primary market. The securities institutions should 
assess the risk-bearing capacity of the potential investors, and fully disclose investment risks to the 
investors. Meanwhile, the GEMC gradually establish risk alert systems and further education 
mechanisms to consolidate the investor protection in the emerging market. 
To Sum up, the GEMC is different from China primary stock market because of their different 
establishing backgrounds, different listing requirements for firms at developing stages, and differently 
experienced investors. 
 
4. Conclusion and Limitation 
This preliminary study on the Chinese emerging and developing share market explores some new 
causes that result in the significant features. Based on the up-to-dated data, it reveals some new 
findings that are rarely discussed to account for the characteristics. This paper suggests three main 
factors: unseasoned investors, unreasonable investor’s demands to IPO shares, imbalanced industrial 
structure of the listed firms, which may all contribute to these features. It also finds that the 
foreign-currency trading platform has no significant contribution to boost the Chinese financial market. 
On the contrary, the alternative share market-GEMC facilitates those small companies to raise capital 
and diversifies the Chinese equity market. 
This paper, as a phased achievement, is a part of my PhD dissertation, which empirically investigates 
the relationships between the financial determinants that influence the approval probability of an IPO in 
the emerging GEMC. It provides the further empirical study with an institutional context, although the 
incremental contribution to existing knowledge is limited. The main purpose of this paper is here to 
ignite more potential discussions on the aforesaid factor sand other fresh questions arising in the 
developing market, which are expected to be contributive. Additionally, this paper is expected to draw 
more potential attentions to the developing stock market; the GEMC is a virgin but fertile area in 
academia, which possesses abundant and unique research resource for researchers to study and explore. 
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Endnotes 
[1]. This statistics was based on the figure of stock exchanges that attracted some studies to investigate 
them, but some literature proposed lower number than this. For example, Caglio et al. (2011) 
investigating stock markets in 90 countries, suggest 32 countries have active listing markets with a 
substantial number of cross listings, but they do not indicate the number of active markets in each 
counties. 
[2]. Bloomberg, 2010, “China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Economy,” Available at: 
http://www. bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16. 
[3]. http://investing.businessweek.com/research/sectorandindustry/overview/sectorlanding?region=us. 
 
